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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE- MINIMUM CONTACTS-EIGHTH CIRCUIT
SURVEY. Mfountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651
(8th Cir. 1982).
Mountaire Feeds (Mountaire), an Arkansas corporation, was
engaged in the manufacture and marketing of animal feeds. In Jan-
uary 1977, the president of Agro Impex (Agro), an international cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas, called
Mountaire inquiring about prices for certain feeds. In November
1977, Agro placed a telephone order for four shipments of feed and
confirmed the purchase by letter. To secure payment for this
purchase, Agro provided Mountaire with an irrevocable letter of
credit issued by a Texas bank and presented through an Arkansas
bank. Communications were exchanged between Agro and
Mountaire concerning packaging, labelling and shipping, and Agro
sent Mountaire shipping labels for the bags of feed. Subsequent
purchases in January and March of 1978 were made using the same
process. All contacts between the parties were by mail or telephone.
An Agro agent or official was never physically present in Arkansas.
When Agro refused to pay for the last nine shipments of feed,
Mountaire filed suit in Arkansas state court for the unpaid balance.
Service of process was obtained under the Arkansas long-arm stat-
ute.' Agro responded by removing the action to federal district
court2 and entering a motion to quash service of process for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
The district court granted Agro's motion, holding that the qual-
ity of Agro's contacts with the forum state was not adequate to allow
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502(C)(1)(a)and (C)(2) (1979) provide:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or
by an agent, as to a (cause of action) (claim of relief) arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;...
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
(cause of action) (claim for relief) arising from acts enumerated in this section may
be asserted against him.
2. Removal of the action to federal district court was based on diversity of citizenship,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
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Arkansas to assume jurisdiction.3 Mountaire appealed. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the judgment. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex,
S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982).
Much has changed in the area of personal jurisdiction since the
Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff,4 declared that the constitu-
tional basis for state jurisdiction over an individual is dependent
upon the physical presence of the individual or his property within
the boundaries of the state. This doctrine, based on state sover-
eignty, defined jurisdiction for sixty-seven years until the decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.' International Shoe recog-
nized certain exceptions6 to the Pennoyer decision and announced a
standard that not only protected the constitutional due process
rights of the nonresident,7 but also served the jurisdictional needs of
the states as well.' International Shoe stated that, for a court to exer-
3. "It is the quality rather than the quantity of the contacts with the forum state that
must be considered in determining jurisdictional questions." Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro
Impex, S.A., No. LR-C-78-259 (E.D. Ark. filed Oct. 27, 1980).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). This was an attempt by the plaintiff to attach the property of a
nonresident defendant after the execution on a default judgment against the defendant. The
nonresident had not been served with process in the state, and the attached property, though
within the forum state, was not owned by the defendant until after the judgment against
him. Thus, neither the requirements of in personam nor in rem jurisdiction were met. The
Pennoyer court held the assertion of jurisdiction by the forum state in this situation to be
invalid.
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. See, e.g., Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (jurisdiction over a person not in
the state was based on his domicile in the forum state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)
(jurisdiction was based on the implied consent of an individual who traveled on a state's
roads; since the state had the power to protect its citizens and property, it had the power to
coerce consent to jurisdiction to achieve those ends); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905)
(quasi-in rem jurisdiction was based on the attachment of a debt owed to the nonresident by
a third person traveling through the forum state); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882)
(jurisdiction was based on the implied consent of a corporation doing business in a state;
since the state had the power to license or exclude corporations, it had the power to coerce
consent to jurisdiction); But cf. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919) (Justice Holmes dis-
cussed the difficulties with the doctrine of implied consent and the legal fiction on which it
rested).
For an analysis of post Pennoyer-pre International Shoe developments, see, e.g., Kur-
land, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla" A Review, 25 U. CmI. L. REV. 569 (1958); and Lewis,
The "Forum State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adudication. Home-Court Horses
Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 775-80 (1982).
7. "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
8. The language and description of contacts deemed sufficient by the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe are largely taken from earlier cases which had hammered out tests of their own
in trying to avoid the restrictions of Pennoyer. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
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cise jurisdiction over an individual not present in the state, pur-
poseful or beneficial contacts must be found between the
nonresident and the forum state and there must be a connection be-
tween the cause of action and those contacts.9 The International
Shoe decision also suggested that if the nonresident had persistent
contacts with the forum state, even though there was no connection
between the claim and the contacts, the forum state would have ju-
risdiction due to the benefits and protections the nonresident had
received from that state.'0
The cases following International Shoe further reduced the ju-
risdictional restraints on the states. From Travelers Health Associa-
tion v. Virginia,1' which followed the main emphasis of International
Shoe, to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.' 2 and McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co .,13 which allowed jurisdiction in the
most marginal of situations, a trend toward liberalized personal ju-
risdiction emerged. 4
(1940) (used the standard of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to allow
jurisdiction); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (a single act by its nature and quality
may be enough to allow jurisdiction); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (the state
extracted jurisdictional consent by statute based on public interest of the forum state); St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (if activities of a corporation are not only continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, then contacts are adequate to uphold
jurisdiction).
9. 326 U.S. at 319-20.
10. Id. at 318.
11. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). The Court upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance
company which had solicited the business of Virginia residents through the mail. There
were many policy holders in Virginia, and many claims against the nonresident company
had been investigated there. Additionally, the Court referred to the traditional state control
and regulation of the insurance business as a point of contact between the nonresident and
the state.
12. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Benguet was located in the Philippine Islands. During World
War 11 the president of the corporation returned to Ohio, but continued to run the business,
thereby generating many contacts in Ohio. A suit was brought against the Philippine com-
pany in Ohio, even though the damages, the plaintiff and the defendant were located else-
where. Through the many contacts with the forum state, the defendant had taken advantage
of the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws, and thus the state's assertion of
jurisdiction would not be unreasonable or a violation of due process rights.
13. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the Court upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident
insurance company which had issued a reinsurance policy to a California resident who was
the only policy holder in the state. The Court decided the contract with the California resi-
dent was enough of a connection to the forum state, by itself, to support jurisdiction. The
Court cited the interest of the forum state, by way of insurance regulations, and felt that a
balancing of the hardships between plaintiff and defendant was persuasive in allowing Cali-
fornia to have jurisdiction. This was supported by the affirmative nature of the nonresi-
dent's contact and the forum state's concern with providing protection for its citizens.
14. Id. at 222. "Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly dis-
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The Court slowed this trend in Hanson v. Denckla, 5 which as-
serted the primacy of contact by the nonresident with the forum
state over the due process analysis which had dominated earlier. In
Hanson the Court recognized the trend toward expansion of juris-
diction, but noted that such a trend did not herald "the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts."'
16
Having addressed the proper approach to personal jurisdiction
issues, the Court did not consider this topic again for nineteen years.
During this period the state and federal courts struggled with the
conflicting signals from the available Supreme Court decisions.
Some courts stayed very close to the language of International
Shoe,'7 while others forged ahead with standards and tests of their
own, avoiding strict application of the Supreme Court language. 8
In 1977 and 1978 the Supreme Court handed down the first
personal jurisdiction decisions in nineteen years: Shaffer v. Heil-
cernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions and other nonresidents."
15. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). A Delaware bank was named as trustee by an individual who
later died in Florida. The legatees of her will brought suit in Florida to have the trust pass
to them, rather than to the named beneficiaries of the trust. The Delaware trustee chal-
lenged Florida's jurisdiction. The Court found insufficient contacts by the Delaware trustees
and no connection between the cause of action and the forum state.
The Court noted that the defendant in McGee was an insurance company which solic-
ited a California resident. Thus, the strong traditional interest in and regulation of insur-
ance by the states was focused on the nonresident when the insurance policy was sent to
California. However, the Delaware trustee in Hanson had not "performed any acts in Flor-
ida that [bore] the same relationship to the agreement as the solicitation in McGee." Id. at
252. The trustee had not "purposefully avail[ed] [himselfl of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id.
at 253.
16. Id. at 251.
17. See, e.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965) (five part test
used to allow jurisdiction over a nonresident who sent products directly into the forum
state); L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus. Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) (jurisdic-
tion denied when the only contact was negotiation and acceptance of a single contract to be
delivered to another state). See also Comment, Constitutional Law-In Personam Jurisdic-
tion. Federalism and Fairness as Functions of Minimum Contacts-A Conceptual Failure:
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 796, 801 n.37 (1980) for a list
of cases which "remained within the spirit of International Shoe and its progeny." Id. at
801.
18. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732
(1966). Phillips was a tort case which upheld jurisdiction while rejecting the literal applica-
tion of the "purposefully avails" standard of Hanson. The basis of jurisdiction was fairness
to the plaintiff and no showing of unfairness to the defendant. In Cornelison v. Chaney, 16
Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) the court upheld jurisdiction over the
nonresident truck driver who was on his way to the forum state. Jurisdiction was based on
his past routes and his intent to enter the forum.
[Vol. 5:553
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ner'9 and Kulko v. Superior Court.2 ° In each case, jurisdiction over
the nonresident was denied, as the Court relied more on Hanson's
stricter standard of purposeful contacts.2' The Court also evidenced
disfavor with using the forum state interest to supply the missing
ingredient for jurisdiction.22
Within two years the Supreme Court was called upon to clarify
the minimum contacts test again in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson.23 The Court addressed the use of foreseeability as a
method for asserting jurisdiction, restricted the degree to which the
nonresident's foreseeability of a contact could control jurisdiction,2 4
and declared an additional limitation on jurisdiction in their refer-
ence to interstate federalism.25 It is from these cases that the Eighth
19. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). This was a stockholder derivative action, in which the plaintiff
tried to gain quasi-in rem jurisdiction over the corporation's stockholders by attaching
shares and options of the corporation. The defendants were found to have had insufficient
contacts with the forum state to meet the International Shoe minimum contacts test. Since
they had no purposeful contact with the forum state they had no reason to anticipate such
quasi-in rem jurisdiction.
20. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). This was an action for child support in which the Court held
that a father, who had allowed his daughter to leave New York and live with her mother in
California, had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws
of the forum state; did not gain economic benefit from the move by his daughter; could not
have reasonably expected to be subject to California's jurisdiction; and had not initiated the
contact with California, but rather, had acquiesced to the request of his daughter.
21. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93-94.
22. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 214-16; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98-101. See also Note, The Long-
Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REV.
175 (1979).
23. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). This was a tort action in which the plaintiffs tried to get juris-
diction over a nonresident automobile distributor and retailer who, the plaintiff maintained,
should have foreseen, by the nature of the product, that an automobile sold in the New
England area could cause an injury in Oklahoma. Jurisdiction was denied.
24. There are two kinds of foreseeability which might influence a personal jurisdiction
question; first, whether the nonresident reasonably can foresee causing an effect or conse-
quence in the forum state, and second, whether he reasonably can foresee being haled into
court there. The first is too broad. It is based on the question of likelihood and is rejected in
World- Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 297. The second is more troublesome for the Court.
Jurisdiction based on foreseeability of being haled into court is the standard, but is limited
by reference to interstate federalism and the need for states to respect the sovereignty of one
another. Id. at 293.
25. "[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdic-
tional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. A much more recent comment on the issues of
forum state interest and interstate federalism appears in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982). This was a case in which sanc-
tions under F.R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) were applied to a nonresident who would not comply with
an order compelling discovery necessary to establish jurisdiction. The Court explained that
the ability of a state to assert jurisdiction is limited by the concept of fairness, which is the
basis of the individual's due process rights. "The personal jurisdiction requirement recog-
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Circuit developed the standards for personal jurisdiction applied in
Mountaire.
The leading Eighth Circuit case on the topic, Aflanase v. Econ-
omy Baler Co ,26 was a tort case. Aftanase involved a Minnesota
resident who was injured by a metal baler manufactured in Michi-
gan and sold in the forum state of Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit
reviewed the Supreme Court cases from International Shoe to Han-
son, and formulated its own five factor test for determining which
minimum contacts would support jurisdiction and yet not violate
constitutional due process.2 7  The Aftanase court divided the five
factors into three primary and two secondary considerations.
The primary factors are (1) the quantity of contacts with the
forum state; (2) the nature and quality of contacts with the forum
state; and (3) the source and connection of the cause of action with
those contacts. The secondary factors are: (4) the interest of the
forum state and (5) the convenience of the parties.28
In Aftanase the court found "some quantity of contacts, ' 29 and
"an element of quality in the contacts, ' 30 and a connection between
the contacts and the cause of action. Looking at the secondary fac-
tors the court found an interest by the state in providing a forum,
and no issue of convenience that would be determinative. 3' The
court indicated that not all five factors need be present in substantial
degree for jurisdiction to be constitutionally effected. Based on their
analysis, the Eighth Circuit found "more than the minimum con-
nizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." Id. at 2104. In a note
the Court added,
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of feder-
alism concerns.
Id. at 2105 n.lO.
26. 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
27. Those cases were said to "establish only general and not precise guidelines." Id. at
197. The court emphasized the fact-intensive nature of personal jurisdiction cases, citing
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
28. 343 F.2d at 197.
29. The "quantity of contacts" analysis focused on the number of shipments over a
period of time into the forum state. Id.
30. The "quality" analysis focuses on two general contacts. The baler in the forum state
was itself a contact. The quality of that contact was enhanced by the baler's size and its
potential for harm. The shipments into the forum state were also contacts. Their quality
was enhanced since each was an affirmative act of the nonresident. Id.
31. Id.
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tacts which the Supreme Court has prescribed as the standard
"32
The next Eighth Circuit decision concerning personal jurisdic-
tion was Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp." This
was a contract action in which the nonresident defendant took an
order from a Minnesota plaintiff, and with knowledge of the buyer's
residence, shipped the equipment directly to the plaintiff in Minne-
sota.34 Even though all of the activity within the forum state was
carried out by the plaintiff and could easily be considered unilateral
activity, 35 the court thought the knowing, direct shipment of a prod-
uct into the forum state was a contact whose quality was such that
jurisdiction was consistent with constitutional requirements.
The Electro-Craft court also made a distinction between a non-
resident buyer and a nonresident seller. The seller, by shipping
goods into the forum state, in exchange for the right to compete for
sales in the forum state market, "subjects itself to the obligation of
amenability to suit ' 36 in the forum state. The nonresident buyer has
no such gain and is therefore subject to no such obligation. 37 Thus,
in Electro-Craft, once the nonresident seller had taken the first af-
firmative step, he was subject to jurisdiction, even though the re-
mainder of the activity in the forum was the plaintiff's unilateral
activity.
The Eighth Circuit's next opportunity to consider the limits of
jurisdiction came in Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp.38 Juris-
diction was allowed over a nonresident company whose officers
were present in the forum state two days for contract negotiations.
The court, because of the voluntary and purposeful presence of the
32. Id.
33. 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 368. Although the equipment was shipped F.O.B. Texas, the defendant made
the arrangements and knew the equipment was being shipped directly to Minnesota. Id. at
369.
35. In Scullin Steel v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 313 (8th Cir. 1982),
the Eighth Circuit characterized the performance of the resident plaintiff in Electro-Craft as
"unilateral."
36. 417 F.2d at 368.
37. Other jurisdictions have also recognized this factor as a valid distinction. See, e.g.,
Nordberg Div. of Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Hudson Eng'g. Corp., 361 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Marshall Egg Transp. Co. v. Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161
(1967); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l. Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d
732 (1962); Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d
381 (1961); Coan v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959); cf., Tube Turns Div. of
Chemetron v. Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Vacu-Maid, Inc. v. Coving-
ton, 530 P.2d 137 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (both basing the distinction on acts).
38. 421 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1970).
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company's agents in the forum state, found this contact "signifi-
cant" 39 enough to satisfy one of the prerequisites of jurisdiction.40
The contact was also held to have "give[n] rise to the claim involved
in the lawsuit"'" and to raise the forum state interest "in protecting
the rights of its citizens under a contract negotiated and effectuated
in [the forum state]."42
In Gardner Engineering Corp. v. Page Engineering Co ,43 the
Eighth Circuit allowed jurisdiction over a nonresident in an antici-
patory breach of contract action. The fact that the nonresident had
promised to "supply specially designed machinery and equipment
to be installed in Arkansas under its supervision," was enough to
establish the necessary connection with the forum state.4 5 The Gard-
ner court, in applying the Aftanase test, looked to the quality of the
contacts as the determining factor in its decision. The contacts were
held to be an expression of the intention to use the forum state as a
base of operations for work to be done under the proposed con-
tract.46 This affirmative act by the defendant satisfied the court that
there was no violation of due process in granting jurisdiction over
the defendant. 7
With Block Industries v. D.H.J Industries, Inc.48 the trend to-
ward expansion of jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit began to slow.
39. Id. at 469.
40. Id. at 470 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
41. Id.
42. Id. In Aftanase, a tort action, the forum state interest was to provide the injured
citizen with a convenient forum. 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
In Electro-Craft, a contract action, the forum state interest in the product which was
sent into the forum was declared to be "obvious" and was not further explained. 417 F.2d at
367.
43. 484 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 32.
45. Id. at 31 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). No
analysis of McGee is offered other than an assertion that the promise of performance within
the forum state provided a substantial connection with the state.
46. The contacts included: (1) a letter sent from Arkansas, the forum state, to the non-
resident defendant asking for bids, (2) a letter from the defendant to Arkansas, not in re-
sponsL. to the letter of the plaintiff, but on the nonresident's own initiative, announcing its
interest in bidding for the project, and (3) the establishment, by mutual arrangement, of a
base of operations in Arkansas from which the work could be performed. Id. at 32.
47. Cf., Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
California jurisdiction was allowed over a nonresident truck driver who, as the result of an
accident, injured a California resident in Nevada, near the California state line. The court
reasoned that the intention of the driver to enter the state, shown by his many previous trips
by that route and the continuity of those trips over several years, was enough to uphold
jurisdiction.
48. 495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974).
NOTES
In Block the court denied jurisdiction in a tort action in which the
defendant, Block, wanted to join two nonresident suppliers as third
party defendants. The complaint alleged that Block manufactured a
shirt which was sold to the plaintiff, who was injured when the shirt
caught fire. Since the material supplied to Block by the nonresi-
dents at most only met the description of the material which caught
fire, the court held the supplier's contacts to be insufficient to sup-
port jurisdiction.49 Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc .0 de-
cided shortly after Block, permitted jurisdiction over a nonresident
in a contract action. The court noted that the contract was partially
performed in the forum state. Caesar's World has been subse-
quently cited to support the denial of jurisdiction in which there is
not at least partial performance of the contract in the forum state.5 '
The Eighth Circuit handed down three personal jurisdiction
cases in 1977, s ' which was also the year the Supreme Court broke its
long silence on that topic.5 3 The three Eighth Circuit decisions all
concerned the same plaintiff, Aaron Ferer, and were based on the
same cause of action. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., a Nebraska scrap
metal broker, was preparing to declare bankruptcy. During this
time, Ferer had contracts with several nonresident companies for
the delivery of goods. The completion of the contracts would have
been to Ferer's benefit. The nonresident companies, however,
stopped delivery of the goods that were still under their control
when they learned of the impending bankruptcy. Ferer brought suit
against these companies to compel them to complete the contracts,
alleging their noncompletion constituted voidable preferential trans-
fers in violation of the bankruptcy code.5 4 In each case, Ferer had
difficulty obtaining jurisdiction because, as a broker, very little of
the contractual activity had occurred in Nebraska.
In Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron," the court
found that each of four nonresident defendants had a contract with
the plaintiff which was to be performed totally outside the forum
49. Id. at 260.
50. 498 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1974).
51. See, e.g., Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450,
454-55 (8th Cir. 1977).
52. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir.
1977); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 121 1 (8th Cir. 1977);
Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
53. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
54. For an explanation of the bankruptcy problem and Aaron Ferer's complaint see
Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron, 558 F.2d 450, 452 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977).
55. 558 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1977).
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state. The defendants' only contacts with the forum state were made
by letters and telephone calls to and from the plaintiff. The court
held that these "did not supply the necessary minimal contact"
needed to establish jurisdiction.56 Again, the Eighth Circuit used
theAftanase five factor test, but, unlike in Gardner,5 a case allowing
jurisdiction in an anticipatory breach of contract action, the Eighth
Circuit gave no indication which factors they considered significant.
The second and third Aaron Ferer cases were decided later in
1977.58 In the third case, Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversfied Met-
als Corp ., the court again denied jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendants. In this instance, Ferer had asserted jurisdiction based
on the volume of business each defendant conducted with Ferer.
The court found that business volume could not make up for the
lack of contact with the forum. The court did find one instance of
contact with the forum state based on a contract with one of the six
defendants. However, that lone contact was deemed insufficient
since the defendant had not designated, as a requirement of the con-
tract,6' that the activity on the part of Aaron Ferer must take place
56. Seven cases were cited in support of this proposition, all from the Second, Third and
Fifth Circuits. Id. at 455. The language from Gardner, appearing at 484 F.2d at 32, that
"where the negotiations leading to a contract are initiated by a letter from the forum state or
by a letter directed to the forum state, the nature of the contacts cannot be deemed to be
insignificant," was ignored by the Eighth Circuit in Atlas Scrap Iron.
57. 484 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1973).
58. In the second of these cases, Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel
Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977), Ferer alleged that in certain dealings with the defendants,
products handled by Ferer originated in the forum state of Nebraska. The court found,
however, "out of fifteen years of trading with [American Compressed Steel], Aaron Ferer
has directed our attention to only two contracts under which metal moved. . . through the
State of Nebraska." Id. at 1210. It was noted that "those contracts are totally unrelated to
the complaints in the cases here on appeal," and thus not sufficient to justify the assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 1211. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the
state interest and convenience factors of the Aftanase test could not control the minimum
contacts question without sufficient contacts first being established utilizing the three pri-
mary factors. Id. at 1210 n.5.
59. 564 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1977).
60. The plaintiff conducted $10,000,000 worth of business with Mueller Brass Co., one
of the six defendants. Id. at 1214.
61. Id. at 1215. See also Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co.,
597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). In Lakeside the court re-
versed a grant of jurisdiction by the lower court, stating that although the defendant has "in
a sense caused the activity. . . by placing the order," the resident plaintiff was "in absolute
control . . . [ofl that activity" and made a unilateral decision to conduct the activity in the
forum state. Id. at 603. In a footnote, the court stated that it would express no opinion on
whether the result would be different if the contract required the resident to perform in the
forum state. Id. at 603 n.13. Lakeside also provides a survey of the circuits on this issue.
Id. at 601.
NOTES
within the forum state. Thus, an incidental, or even foreseeable,
contact was not an adequate basis for jurisdiction. The basis neces-
sary for jurisdiction was "the intention of invoking the benefits and
protections of the laws of the forum state."62
Another aspect of Diversified Metals, and one which will affect
future Eighth Circuit decisions, is the treatment of the distinction
between buyers and sellers which was drawn in Electro-Craft.
Electro-Craft and six lower court cases were cited for the proposi-
tion that the seller and buyer are held to different standards.63 The
court in Diversified Metals did not wholly endorse the Electro- Craft
position, holding that "the ultimate test is whether the [nonresident]
defendant, either as seller or buyer, has performed 'some act by
which [it has] purposefully [availed] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.'64
Thus, by making the test for buyer and seller the same, the
Eighth Circuit implies that a nonresident buyer or seller who,
through affirmative acts such as solicitation, makes contact with a
state, has met the "purposefully avails" standard, and will be subject
to jurisdiction as a result. However, Eighth Circuit cases shed little
light on the impact of solicitation as a factor in minimum contacts
analysis, since no Eighth Circuit case turns on solicitation to estab-
lish jurisdiction. Other courts are equally vague on the subject:
California has held solicitation alone is not enough for jurisdic-
tion;65 a New York case seems to establish jurisdiction based on
contacts made entirely through solicitation efforts; 66 and the Fourth
Circuit has held both ways on the issue. When solicitation is not
62. 564 F.2d at 1215. See also Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). The court in Hutson rejected the "stream of
commerce" theory found in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), on the grounds of due process. The court thought that incon-
venience to the foreign defendant was the controlling factor, especially when there were
other, closer defendants.
63. 564 F.2d at 1214-15.
64. Id. at 1215 (emphasis added) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
65. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1959). The defendant had solicited business in the forum state, but the cause of action
arose elsewhere.
66. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208 N.E.2d 439
(1965). Although the defendant airline did not fly to New York, jurisdiction was allowed.
Jurisdiction was based on the defendant's New York ticket office, which leased office space,
employed several people, and had a bank account in New York in addition to doing public
relations and publicity work for the defendant.
67. Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
948 (1971) (denying jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who only solicited in the fo-
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an element of the defendant's activity, courts often suggest that ele-
ment would have been determinative. 68 However, when solicitation
is present, it may not be enough for jurisdiction without some other
significant contact with the forum state.69
Despite this question regarding solicitation, the Eighth Circuit
has consistently placed strong emphasis on the "purposefully avails"
standard since the Aaron Ferer cases.7v In Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v.
Agro Impex, S.A .,v" the court first noted that the nonresident Agro
did not contest the question whether their activity was enough to
satisfy the "transacting business" clause of the Arkansas long-arm
statute.7z The issue in Mountaire was, however, whether the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction by the Arkansas courts was consistent
with federal due process.73
rum, since the plaintiff's injury did not arise out of the nonresident's activity in the forum
state); Lee v. Walworth Value Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973). This court distinguished
Ratliff on the basis of forum state interest. Here, the defendant's contact with the forum was
solicitation only, but since the cause of action arose on the high seas and no better jurisdic-
tion existed, jurisdiction was allowed.
68. See, e.g., Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 543 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.
1976).
69. For cases denying jurisdiction when there was solicitation but no other significant
contact, see Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (activity after the solicitation was unilateral
activity of the resident); Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971) (cause of action did not arise from solicitation); Fisher Governor
Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959) (cause of action did
not arise from solicitation). For cases allowing jurisdiction when there was some other sig-
nificant conduct beyond solicitation, see Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d
933 (10th Cir. 1977); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.
1968); accord, Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
70. See, e.g., Scullin Steel Co. v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309 (8th Cir.
1982) in which the resident buyer was not subject to Missouri jurisdiction. The court held
that the contacts with the forum state by mail and phone, a provision in the contract for
"F.O.B. forum state," and payment in Missouri did not amount to the minimal contacts
necessary for due process. The activity in the forum state was held to be the resident's
unilateral activity. In Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980) jurisdiction was denied over a nonresident seller in a
contract action in which the products did not reach the forum state. It was held insufficient
even though the product was "destined" for the forum. In Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d
833 (8th Cir.), (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978), jurisdiction was denied over a
nonresident company which put a metal chain into the stream of commerce. The chain
found its way into Arkansas and caused an injury. The court held the connection, via an
exclusive distributorship, to be too attenuated, id. at 837, since the defendant did not solicit
business in the forum state.
71. 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 653, see supra, note 1.
73. Id. at 653.
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Before addressing the due process issue, the court referred to
the Electro-Craft decision. The court noted that the plaintiff's reli-
ance upon Electro-Craft could not help his case even though in
Electro-Craft, jurisdiction had been allowed over a nonresident
when the plaintiff's activity in the forum was unilateral. Electro-
Craft, the court pointed out, was modified by the Eighth Circuit in
Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., and in
Mountaire, with the result that "the test as applied to either nonresi-
dent sellers or buyers is now the same."'7 4 However, the court distin-
guished the Electro-Craft decision by pointing out that the
nonresident defendant in Electro-Craft was a seller, not a buyer, as
here.75 Then, referring to Hanson v. Denckla, the court stressed that
the "ultimate test" is the "purposefully avails" standard, which must
be applied to both buyer and seller.76
The court also referred to the five factor test of Aftanase, and
cautioned that the two last named factors are not determinative.77
The Aftanase test is not referred to again.78 Once more citing Han-
son, the court stressed the "purposefully avails" standard and the
fact that unless the defendant has a direct relationship with the fo-
rum state, there is only unilateral activity by the plaintiff.79 The
Supreme Court decision in World- Wide Volkswagen was cited for
the proposition that foreseeability alone was not sufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction under the due process clause."
With this as a backdrop, the court reviewed the contacts of
Agro, and concluded that "Mountaire's unilateral performance in
the forum state is insufficient to support the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over Agro Impex. "8'  The court then gave a summary of
74. Id. at 654.
75. Id. The court in Mountaire agreed with the decision in Diversified Metals, which
disapproved of the idea that different treatment should be accorded buyer and seller in an
analysis ofjurisdictional issues. The Mountaire court found no difficulty, however, in distin-
guishing the plaintiffs position in Mountaire from the plaintiffs position in Electro-Craft on
exactly that basis.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Aftanase and the three cases immediately following, Electro-Craft, Thompson, and
Gardner, were the only cases to apply the five factor test to the fact situation point by point.
Since Gardner, the test has been cited often, but has never again been subject to a detailed
application to the fact situation of any case in the Eighth Circuit.
79. 677 F.2d at 654.
80. Id. at 656.
81. Id. at 655 (citing Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597
F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980)); Premier Corp. v. Newsom,
620 F.2d 219, 222-23 (10th Cir. 1980); and Barnstone v. Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d
286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Agro's contacts. The list mentioned only the sales contracts between
the parties, their communications by mail, phone, and letters of
credit to a bank in the forum, and payment by Agro sent to the
forum state.82
The sales contracts between Mountaire and Agro did not con-
stitute a basis for jurisdiction, since the contracts tied Agro to the
plaintiff, but not to the forum state.83 Neither was the use of mail,
telephone and banks in the forum state sufficient "standing alone"
to satisfy the minimum contacts test.84 The court did not include in
the list any initiation of contact by Agro. Finally, the court cited
McQuay, Inc v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc ,85 and said that the amount
of the payment due a company in the forum state does nothing to
strengthen long-arm jurisdiction.86 The court also reviewed a list of
contacts which were not made by Agro: (1) no sales representatives
in Arkansas, (2) no supervision of the contract by Agro's agents or
officers in Arkansas, and (3) no performance of the contract in
Arkansas.87
Mountaire brings into focus two unsettled issues of personal ju-
risdiction law. The first issue is the effect that solicitation by the
nonresident will have on the court's analysis. The second is whether
the nonresident buyer should have a special status regarding per-
sonal jurisdiction issues.8  The Mountaire court asserts that a buyer
should have no special status. Then, however, by ignoring the
buyer's solicitation of the contact, the court ignores almost the only
activity of a buyer which could form the basis for a minimal contact.
The Electro-Craft decision gave the nonresident buyer protec-
tion from foreign jurisdiction based on his status as a buyer versus
that of a seller.89 Diverso'edMetals, the thirdAaron Ferer case, took
away that status protection and substituted the "purposefully avails"
standard of Hanson v. Denckla. Thus, in the Eighth Circuit, the
82. 677 F.2d at 655.
83, Id. (citing Iowa Electric Power & Light Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1303 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980) and Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Com-
pressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1977)).
84. 677 F.2d at 656.
85. 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971).
86. 677 F.2d at 656.
87. Id. at 655. Conspicuous by its absence from this list of missing contacts is any
mention of "no solicitation or initiation of contact by the nonresident."
88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
89. "[Slolicitation by a nonresident purchaser for delivery outside the state is more min-
imal contact than that of a [nonresident] seller soliciting the right to ship goods into the
forum state." Electro-Craft, 417 F.2d at 368.
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nonresident buyer would be exposed to jurisdiction only if he inten-
tionally conducted certain activities in the forum which are recog-
nized as significant by the Eighth Circuit. 90
The ruling in Diversfied Metals, endorsed by the court in
Mountaire, is not in accord with several other courts. 9' However,
the Mountaire court has reached the result of protecting the buyer
by ignoring the buyer's solicitation of the contact. It is not clear
whether there would be jurisdiction in the following situations: a
nonresident mail order buyer ordering from a seller in the forum
state,92 a nonresident buyer placing an ad in a publication which
reaches the forum state,93 or a nonresident buyer soliciting over the
phone or through the mail.94
In Mountaire it appears that a buyer is protected even though
90. A compilation of the Eighth Circuit contacts sufficient to meet the minimum con-
tacts test would be:
(1) the intentional, knowing and direct delivery of a product into the forum
(Aftanase, Dipersoed Metals and Hutson);
(2) at least partial performance of the contract in the forum (Caesar's World); or
(3) the resident's activity in the forum, in preparation for performance which
must be part of the contractual obligation (Divers'/ed Metals);
(4) for physical presence in the forum to control, it must be in connection with
the making or supervision of the contract (Thompson);
(5) for the forum state interest to control, it must be a clear or statutory interest,
declared with specificity (Iowa Electric):
(a) that would not violate standards of interstate federalism (World-Wide
Volkswagen);
(b) which is limited by the nonresident's due process rights (Ins. Corp. of
Ireland).
91. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See also McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlos-
berg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971) (characterizing the nonresident seller as an
aggressor). Contra Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977)
and In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972). These
cases rejected the automatic characterization of the seller as active and the buyer as passive.
92. See Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) (the mail order buyer
should be protected).
93. The Fifth Circuit found no basis for jurisdiction in this situation when the ads were
placed by a seller. See Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184, 187 (5th Cir.
1978); Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973).
94. See, e.g., Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982)
(jurisdiction denied with phone and mail contacts, but solicitation not discussed); Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974) ("contact by mail alone can
be sufficient"); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 235 (6th Cir.
1972) ("A letter or a telephone call may, in a given situation, be as indicative of substantial
involvement with the forum state as a personal visit by the defendant or its agents"); Al-
chemie Int'l, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1039, 1050 (D.N.J. 1981) (in acknowl-
edging the modern trend to conduct business over the phone and by mail, the court
"therefore count[ed] defendant's calls and mail communications to plaintiff as significant
contacts with the State of New Jersey").
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the solicitation occurs in conjunction with other contacts such as
phone calls, mail, letters of credit and sales contracts between the
parties.95 In the Eighth Circuit there apparently must be a sufficient
contact, independent of any solicitation by the nonresident, for the
nonresident to be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state.
There is still substantial disagreement from court to court and
from circuit to circuit on the treatment of such contacts.96 The
Eighth Circuit's holding in Mountaire, not for what it says but
rather for what it leaves unsaid, will add to the confusion in this
area of law.
George P. Nelson
95. Cf. Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978); Benjamin
v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973).
96. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., Inc., 597 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980). Justice White dissented from the denial of
certiorari since "the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defend-
ant based on contractual dealings with a resident plaintiff has deeply divided the federal and
state courts.") Id. at 909 (citing Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co.,
597 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980)).
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